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1. Introduction 
 This research concerns the interlocking directorates and their potential implications 
for corporate governance practices in Mexico. Recent banking failures have seriously brought 
into question both corporate governance frameworks generally and the protection of 
shareholders more specifically (Heemskerk & Schnyder, 2008; Kirkpatrick, 2009; Shankar 
and Bhattacharya, 2011; Ionescu, 2011). The role of independent directors and interlocked 
directorates in relation to protection of shareholders especially minority shareholders have 
been widely researched and debated in the literature (Zattoni & Cuomo, 2010; Conyon & 
Muldoon, 2006). Nevertheless, these studies were predominately located in developed 
markets (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Huse, 2005; Johnson, Daily, & Ellstrand, 1996; Stiles & 
Taylor, 2001). Interlocking boards and independent directors have critical importance in 
emerging economies given the high concentration of ownership and absence of institutional 
investors (La Porta et al., 1999; 2000; Berglof & Claessens, 2006; Uddin & Choudhury, 
2008). Despite this, research is scarce in emerging economies with some exceptions (Lim & 
Porpora, 1987; Peng et al, 2001; Ong et al., 2003; Silva et al., 2006; Salas-Porras, 2006). 
Mexico, one of the emerging economies, is our research site to investigate network of 
independent directors, its emergence and implications for corporate governance mechanisms. 
For several reasons, the Mexican situation is particularly useful for developing our 
understanding of networks of directors. Mexico has recently undergone huge corporate 
governance reforms and has assimilated the corporate governance model proposed by the 
OECD. One of the main obligations imposed by the Code and the New Securities Law (Ley 
del Mercado de Valores, LMV) on publicly listed corporations is the inclusion of 
independent board members on the board of directors. The background to the OECD’s 
prescriptions is that the previous governance model was inadequate for monitoring and 
controlling company affairs in the best interests of shareholders, especially minority 
shareholders. Strengthening corporate boards by using independent directors was seen as a 
panacea for corporate governance problems. The reforms present an opportune moment to 
investigate their implications for board structures in Mexican corporations.  
 Furthermore, certain preconditions are required in order for the OECD reforms to be 
moderately successful. Previous studies on corporate governance have identified a number of 
essential elements in governing corporations, including well-developed capital markets, 
professional bodies, democratic institutions and a justice system free from political influence 
(Hopper et al., 2009; Tsamenyi & Uddin, 2008; Uddin & Choudhury, 2008). Studies of UK 
and US settings have indicated that these institutions are independent but inextricably linked 
with each other (Chua & Poullaos, 1993), while studies of emerging economies have often 
argued that they are politically charged and family oriented (Uddin & Choudhury, 2008). 
Studies in Mexico and in other Latin American countries have also argued that institutions in 
these countries show similar traits (Chong and Lopez-de-Silanes, 2007; Santiago et al., 
2009). Given the lack of well-developed institutions, the study of interlocking boards and the 
identification of powerful actors in Mexico raise potentially interesting questions and issues. 
Nevertheless, previous studies have not taken a systematic account of whether a pattern of 
interlocking boards does really exist in Mexico. Theoretical explanations of emergence of 
interlocked directorates are important given the serious consequences it has on corporate 
governance mechanisms. Surprisingly, previous studies on interlocked directorates in Mexico 
or elsewhere are devoid of theoretical explanations i.e. broader understanding of emergence 
of networks. This study fills this gap drawing on the Bourdieusian notion of social capital. 
This study poses two empirical questions: does a pattern of interlocking boards exist 
in Mexico, and what positions do actors occupy in the network structure of interlocking 
boards in Mexico? Social network analysis (SNA) was adopted to determine the social 
relationships linking board members and corporations. Previous accounting studies have 
adopted this type of analysis to identify networks of accountants, standard setters and 
managers (Chapman, 1998; Richardson, 2009; Tichy et al., 1979). This study investigates 
networks of boards of directors. It links individuals with corporations and allows the 
production of spatial maps to visualize the network structure of interlocking boards 
(Freeman, 2004). The basic concepts of SNA will be presented later. 
 This study also aims to answer some theoretical questions: why do networks occur, 
and what are their implications for corporate governance practices? In order to provide 
further explanations, this study draws in particular on the Bourdieusian notion of social 
capital (Bourdieu, 1986; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). Bourdieu defines social capital as 
“the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to the possession of a 
durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance and 
recognition – or in other words, to membership in a group – which provides each of its 
members with the backing of the collectively-owned capital, a ‘credential’ which entitles 
them to credit, in the various senses of the word. These relationships may exist only in the 
practical state, in material and/or symbolic exchanges which help to maintain them” 
(Bourdieu, 1986:248-9). As will be explained later, in our case, social capital is created by 
sharing different boards of directors. In other words, the ensemble of connections, contacts, 
relationships, friendships and obligations gives them the power to act in relation to the quality 
and quantity of their relationships, and of relationships with other board members and 
businesspeople. We wish to examine whether the network structure of interlocking boards in 
Mexico reveals the relational practices of board members and the social capital created by 
interlocking boards. This will also help us to understand the emergence of networks. 
 The paper begins with a brief literature review of interlocking boards and an overview 
of the independence of directors in both Anglo-American and less developed countries. 
Detailed accounts of SNA are then provided, followed by an empirical section focusing on 
interlocking boards, relationships, networks and powerful actors. The discussion section, 
drawing on the notion of ‘social capital’, provides an account of why networks occur and 
how they perpetuate the current status of board impotency and corporate governance affairs 
in Mexico. The concluding remarks briefly presents the implications of networked directors 
on the effectiveness of governance and protection of minority shareholders and explains 
avenues of future research. 
2. Previous studies 
 Studies of interlocking boards go back a century or more (Jeidels, 1905; Hilferding, 
1910; Brandeis, 1914; National Resources Committee, 1939). According to Mizruchi & 
Bunting (1981), the causes and consequences of interlocking boards have been a source of 
debate since the Pujo Committee identified interlocking as a problem of corporate 
concentration in the early twentieth century. However, critics of research into interlocking 
boards have argued that interlocking boards are largely irrelevant and that research on the 
interlocking network represents the dominance of method over substance (Stinchcombe, 
1990, cited in Davis, 1996:154). Nevertheless, majority of the research found interlocking 
boards are extremely relevant because, through them, it is possible to trace the social 
embeddedness of corporate governance (Davis, 1986). Through their experiences on other 
boards, interlocking directors act as a conduit for social influences that create an 
informational and normative context – “an embeddedness” – for board decisions 
(Granovetter, 1985, cited in Davis, 1986:154). 
 Research on board interlocks focuses also on how board members serve as a means 
for political and ideological preservation of the interests of the capitalist class (Mariolis & 
Jones, 1982; Ornsten, 1984). The likelihood that interlocking companies will be audited by 
the same public accountancy firm is partially explained by ties between client companies 
created by interlocking directorates (Davison, Stening, & Wai, 1984). This is possible 
because directors who sit on many boards do so in the company of other directors who also 
sit on many boards (Conyon & Muldoon, 2006). Galaskiewicz et al. (1985) found that where 
the CEO was also a member of the social elite, members of this elite were most likely to be 
represented on local boards and tended to choose each other to sit on their own boards. This 
has significant implications because companies obtain information on their respective 
markets through their other directors (Galaskiewicz et al., 1985).  
 In Latin American corporations, a few shareholders (mostly family and friends) have 
significant control rights, and business groups are typically run by the controlling 
shareholders, rather than by professional managers with little equity ownership (Santiago & 
Brown, 2009; Santiago, Brown, & Baez-Diaz, 2009; Watkins, Van Dijk, & Spronk, 2006; 
Salas-Porras, 1992, 2006). Thus, the degree of directors’ independence potentially affects 
minority shareholders’ rights because independent directors may not play an important 
monitoring role, increasing the opportunity for expropriation by majority shareholders 
(Santiago & Brown, 2009). Hence, understanding and taking account of interlocked 
directorates are important to explore especially in emerging economies. 
 In Mexico there is a legal basis for minority shareholders’ rights, but a lack of specific 
regulations makes it possible for majority shareholders to take advantage of the situation to 
benefit from minority shareholders (Babatz-Torres, 1997). Given the under-developed 
markets and democratic institutions in Mexico (Chong & Lopez de Silanes, 2007; Gomes, 
2000), majority shareholders tend to have free reign to occupy top management positions, sit 
on the board of directors, limit trade in shares, and create business conglomerates (Santiago 
& Brown, 2009). Predictably, these issues have led to serious debate about the severe 
consequences of interlocking boards for minority shareholders, especially in concentrated 
shareholding companies. Interlocking boards give rise to powerful and influential actors in 
the field, which may prevent independent directors from playing a role in protecting the 
interests of shareholders, especially minority shareholders, in the context of emerging 
economies (Salas-Porras, 1992, 1997, 2006). Salas-Porras works have researched Mexican 
corporate elites and finds that boards of directors have been selected for economic, regional 
and political interests. Although the corporate board is of particular interest to accounting 
researchers, few studies have focused on establishing whether there is a pattern of 
interlocking boards or identifying the most powerful and influential actors and the 
implications for the corporate governance field in emerging economies including Mexico 
(Boyd, 1990). Surprisingly, most of the existing research devoted to find out the positive 
links of independent directors and book value of corporations. This paper departs from this 
argument and attempt to investigate whether independent directors in a network at all useful 
to governance mechanisms.  
3. Research method: SNA 
 The empirical aim of this paper is to identify the independent directors in a network 
utilising SNA. The main components of any social network are the actors and their 
connections. Social networks can be measured and understood in several ways (Tichy et al., 
1979; Borgatti & Foster, 2003; Wang et al., 2009). In this study, we use a two-mode network 
analysis. A two-mode network is also known as an affiliation network representing the 
association between two or more sets of nodes, where each set is a different social entity 
(Wang et al., 2009:12). In our case, one set of nodes represents board members while the 
other represents corporations, with ties representing directors sitting on company boards. 
Graphical representations1 are used in the paper to capture the visual image of network. 
Knove and Yang (2008:62) observe that a primary use of graph theory in SNA is to identify 
the important or prominent actors at both the individual and group levels.  
One of the main purposes of SNA of interlocking boards is to search for the most influential, 
important and powerful members and their networks. Centrality is an important conceptual 
tool for analysing power in social networks. Different positional measures reflect the location 
of actors in a network. The focus is on the centrality of the board member or the location of 
the board member in the network. The concept of centrality may be operationalized and 
measured in a variety of ways. In this study we use Freeman’s approach (1979) with two 
measures of centrality: degree centrality and eigenvalues. These measures of degree 
centrality for two-mode networks are calculated using UCINET.2 
 In a two-mode network, the degree centrality for a board member is the number of 
corporations in which he or she sits on a board. The maximum degree for a board member is 
the total number of corporations (Everett & Borgatti, 2005). For Freeman (1979), the degree 
centrality of a network is calculated by counting the number of adjacent links to or from a 
board member. This is based solely on direct connections and is an appropriate measure to 
capture power-enhancing behaviours that occur via direct interaction, such as ingratiation and 
reciprocation (Brass & Burkhardt, 1993). Another measure of centrality is eigenvalue 
centrality, an indicator of popularity, indicating the node or board member with the most 
connections to other nodes or board members who at the same time are connected to other 
highly-connected board members. In other words, eigenvalue indicates board members with 
the highest social capital in terms of the possession of a durable network. The eigenvalue also 
identifies the centre of cohesive groups, and helps to identify those board members with the 
smallest distance from others in terms of the overall structure of the social network. The 
highest scores indicate that board members are more central to the main pattern of distances 
among all board members; lower values indicate that board members are more peripheral. 
 The data used in the study consisted of 1,442 internal and external board members of 
the population of 126 Mexican corporations that traded in the Mexican Stock Market as of 
January 2011. The population included 19 natural resources companies, 27 industrials, 18 
services and goods of non-basic consumption, 24 frequent consumption products, 5 health, 21 
financial services, and 12 telecommunications. The sources of data were the corporate annual 
reports published on the web page of the Mexican Stock Exchange Directory in January 
2011. The information provided in the corporate reports includes the names of board 
members, which are classified as main, substitute, patrimonial, related and independent. In 
some cases, the annual report also includes biographical information on board members. In 
the next section, the centrality, power and prestige of interlocking boards in Mexico are 
demonstrated. 
4. Power, Centrality and Prestige of Board Members 
 Power is a fundamental property of social structures, and the location of a board 
member within the network directly represents his or her access to information. This is 
relevant if board members are seen as conduits of information between corporations (Everard 
& Henry, 2002). In the social network approach, power is inherently relational, and analysis 
of a network reveals whether an actor is embedded in a relational network. An actor’s 
location in a social network determines his or her prominence and importance in the network. 
Hence, the measures of centrality (degree centrality and eigenvalue) were calculated using 
UCINET 6 for the entire population of board members and corporations in the Mexican 
Stock Market as of January 2011. 
 In order to visualize the network structure of companies sharing two or more board 
members, a technique called spring embedding was applied. The rationale is that board 
members connected by lines are drawn closely together whereas unconnected board members 
are pushed apart. The spring embedding technique treats the lines of the networks as springs 
with a particular elasticity and strength. The procedure searches for a situation in which the 
system of springs is stable (De Nooy, 2003). The result is a graphical representation of 
linkages between board members and corporations. The network is visualized using Netdraw 
software included in UCINET 6, as shown in Figure 1. 
[Insert Figure 1] 
 In Figure 1, red bullets represent board members and blue squares represent 
companies, while lines represent ties between board members and corporations. Figure 1 
demonstrates the connectedness of these corporations via board members, suggesting that the 
corporations employ the same people on their boards. This may reveal little in isolation. 
Nevertheless, it does suggest that independent directors have little time to focus on protecting 
shareholders (in the Mexican case, minority shareholders’ interests). It also indicates that 
independent directors may belong to a large social network. This figure shows the 
interconnections between two or more board members and corporations. Another way in 
which to visualize the implications of interlocking boards in Mexico is to analyse how 
corporations are directly linked. We transform the two-mode network (board members and 
corporations) into a one-mode network for corporations only. This one-mode network draws 
a direct line between any two companies: if they share two or more board members, this line 
has a value (multiplicity) of two or more (De Nooy, 2003). We calculate a one-mode network 
for the companies to establish the relational structure between corporations. Figure 2 shows 
the interconnections between corporations in the Mexican Stock Market. 
[Insert Figure 2] 
 In Figure 2, we can see strong links between corporations through board membership. 
On the left hand side are companies with no connection with other companies in the network. 
These are isolated companies with no relationship through interlocking boards. Of the 126 
corporations in the Mexican Stock Market, only 17 do not share a board member. This shows 
a strong structural relationship between companies created by board member linkages in 
publicly traded corporations in Mexico. In the next section, we examine the location of actors 
in the network structure of interlocking boards in Mexico. The actors’ level of centrality is 
calculated using Freeman’s measures of centrality: degree centrality and eigenvalues. 
4.1 Actors in Networks 
 The board of directors is a determinant of corporate governance as it represents the 
primary decision-making body. Boards of directors are interlinked through a shared director. 
This is an important characteristic, because the network represents connections between 
directors and companies and opportunities for face-to-face interaction. A matrix table was 
constructed of the 1,442 board members and 126 companies traded on the Mexican Stock 
Exchange. The two-mode data were transformed into one-mode data to carry out analysis 
using Freeman’s measure of centrality. Freeman’s output ranks actors from high to low levels 
of centrality. The results for the top fifteen board members are shown in Table 1. 
[Insert Table 1] 
 Table 1 shows the (interpersonal) network of boardroom contacts among the top 
fifteen board members in the Mexican Stock Market. The actor sitting on the highest number 
of boards is Mr Fernando Ruiz Sahagun, who sits on nine boards of directors.3 He is a public 
accountant who has sat on the board of GCC as an independent board member since 2006 
and works as a consultant in Chavez, Ruiz, Zamarripa and Cia, S.C., a consulting firm. He is 
a member of the College of Public Accountants of Mexico and has studied fiscal studies at 
the Universidad Anahuac and the Universidad Panamericana. Mr Alberto Bailleres Gonzalez 
sits on eight boards of directors.4 He holds a bachelor’s degree in economics and chairs the 
governing body of the Mexican Autonomous Institute of Technology (ITAM). Mr Fernando 
Senderos Mestre sits on seven boards5 and is in third place in the table. He is 61 years old and 
holds a bachelor’s degree in business administration. He is chairman of Grupo Kuo and Dine, 
S.A. Mr Valentin Diez Morodo sits on seven boards.6  He is 72 years old and holds a 
bachelor’s degree in business administration. This section has highlighted actors with the 
highest level of centrality, that is, actors sitting on many boards.  
[Insert Table 2] 
 In Table 2, eigenvalues provide a different picture of the position of board members in 
the network structure of interlocking boards in Mexico. Here, we examine the most 
influential board members in the network structure of interlocking boards in Mexico. The 
most influential board members are ranked from high to low according to this measure. It 
shows the fifteen most central actors in terms of the overall structure of the network. Board 
members with the highest scores are the most central to the pattern of distances among all 
board members in the global structure of the network. The board member with the highest 
eigenvalue (0.252) and hence the most central board member in the overall structure of 
interlocking boards in Mexico is Mr Alberto Bailleres Gonzalez, who is in a structural 
position from which he can reach those with the smallest distance from others in the global 
structure of the network. He is better connected to many board members who are also well-
connected to other board members. He is in a very good position within the network to 
transmit information and to influence other board members in the network structure. The 
second highest eigenvalue (0.224) is for Mr Arturo Fernandez Perez, who is chancellor of the 
Mexican Autonomous Institute of Technology (ITAM). The third highest eigenvalue (0.219) 
is for Mr Tomas Lozano Molina, who holds a Law degree and is public notary and lecturer at 
the Escuela Libre de Derecho. 
 The interlocked directorates and powerful actors shown above needs to be understood 
in the context of under developed capital and democratic institutions and family dominated 
companies in emerging economies. According to Santiago & Brown (2009), in a typical large 
Latin American firm, the CEO is usually part of the controlling family; therefore, his or her 
influence over the board of directors is unlimited. Often the independent directors receive the 
multiple directorships from the same business group and enjoy material and symbolic 
benefits come with it (Santiago & Brown, 2009). Without a doubt, this has consequences for 
maintaining the independence, transparency and accountability of corporate governance 
affairs in relation to minority shareholders. The question arises to what extent the 
independent directors are in a position to curve the power of a CEO of large business group?  
Alternatively, one could ask a question whether it is in independent director’s interests to go 
against the CEO. Is it more important for independent directors to be in the network and 
exploit the power they apparently enjoy? These questions are better addressed if further 
explanations of networks and their inherent features are provided. The next section discusses 
this. 
5. Social capital and interlocked boards 
 This paper mobilizes the notion of social capital advanced by Bourdieu and draws on 
previous studies in order to provide further explanations of emergence of networks. In order 
to determine the social capital of board members, we calculated the network of connections 
which each board member can effectively mobilize. As Bourdieu (1986:249) stated, “The 
volume of the social capital possessed by a given agent thus depends on the size of the 
network of connections he can effectively mobilise and on the volume of the capital 
(economic, cultural or symbolic) possessed in his own right by each of those to whom he is 
connected”. Table 1 shows the name of the board member and the size of the network of 
connections he/she can mobilize. Furthermore, there is a brief description of the volume of 
capital (economic, cultural, and symbolic) possessed in their own right by the first two board 
members in the table. For example, in Table 1 we show the interpersonal network of 
boardroom contacts among the top 15 board members in the Mexican Stock Market, showing 
that the actor with the highest centrality ranking sits on ten boards of directors. Board 
members are arranged from high to low levels of “connections” in Table 1. Figure 1 and 2 
also revealed board members have created a network structure of social relationships through 
interlocking boards. For Bourdieu, the network of relationships is “the product of investment 
strategies” which the independent board member has obtained, individually or collectively, 
with the objective of establishing or reproducing social relationships “that are directly usable 
in the short or long term” (Bourdieu, 1986: 249). Board members also have cultural capital 
demonstrated in the credentials they have (e.g. degree in Stanford) and symbolic capital (e.g. 
chairman of the chamber of commerce). These capitals (social, cultural and symbolic) further 
strengthened board members’ investment strategies. They will accumulate as much capital 
(social, cultural and symbolic) as that benefits them.   
 The networking structure of interlocking boards in Mexico shows the relational 
practice of board members and the social capital created by interlocking boards. As Portes 
(1998) has argued, social networks are not a naturally given; on the contrary, they must be 
constructed by investing in strategies oriented to the institutionalization of relationships 
between groups as a function of other benefits. The network of configurations demonstrated 
that board members share a board and related with their peers in the boardroom. Bourdieu 
observed that individuals’ interactions reinforce mutual recognition and acknowledgment as 
members of a network or group (Lin, 1999). These strategies of investment in social 
connections are created to perpetuate the governing elite in Mexican corporations. Our 
empirical results demonstrated that few independent directors dominated majority of the 
corporations in Mexico.  
The main motivation of securing social capital is rooted in material or symbolic 
profits. Being in a network, as evidenced in earlier figures, provides enormous benefit to 
individual independent directors. According to Bourdieu, the existence of a network of 
connections “... is the product of an endless effort at institution, of which institution rites – 
often wrongly described as rites of passage – mark the essential moments and which is 
necessary in order to produce and reproduce lasting, useful relationships that can secure 
material or symbolic profits” (Bourdieu, 1986:249). We observe in Figure 1 above, the 
configuration of the network of connections among board members in the entire population 
of Mexican corporations traded in the Mexican Stock Market as of January 2011. This is 
materially useful for individual members. The more they are connected the more capital they 
can exploit to their advantage. In Table 1 above, we observe the top 15 board members who 
sit on several boards. And in Table 2 above, we observe the top 15 board members 
strategically position in the network of directors in Mexican corporations and who can secure 
material and symbolic profits through the interaction with other board members in the 
network. Therefore, the process of articulation and the concentration and distribution of links 
between board members show the positions of the main interlocking actors and the 
mechanisms that influence the structure of the network in Mexico. Hence, the network 
structure of interlocking boards in Mexico is the product of a continuous series of exchanges 
between board members in which recognition is endlessly affirmed and reaffirmed.   
What are the implications for corporate governance practices of interlocking 
directorates created to gain social capital (economic, cultural or symbolic)? Board members 
in Mexican corporations serve as a means of communication and control for both the 
individual corporations and the majority shareholders of Mexican corporations through the 
network of connections they have created and the social capital (economic, cultural or 
symbolic) which each board member possesses. This raises the question of whether the 
traditional monitoring role of external directors is present and efficient in Mexico and 
whether the mere inclusion of an external director on a small board may improve the minority 
shareholders’ situation, because the incentives that make external directors work on behalf of 
minority shareholders, such as the market for corporate control or compensation, are lacking 
in Latin America.  
Santiago & Brown (2009) have observed that in Mexico, as in most Latin American 
countries, the misalignment of interests between majority and minority shareholders, rather 
than divergence between the goals and objectives of management and owner, is at the root of 
agency problems. Furthermore, corporate governance mechanisms to alleviate agency 
problems are inefficient or non-existent, while the weak legal environment enhances the 
potential for agency problems, especially the expropriation of minority shareholders’ rights 
(Santiago & Brown, 2009). It would not be far from the reality if we can surmise that closely-
connected independent directors in the context of poorly-regulated and under-developed 
market and political institutions have the potential to lead to lack of transparency and control 
as found in previous studies (Santiago & Bown, 2009). These problems have been illustrated 
in a number of governance scandals in Mexico in recent years. Between 2005 and 2012, 
several cases relating to corporate governance practices in publicly-listed Mexican 
corporations have shown the arbitrariness of majority shareholders and how independent 
board members and internal governance systems appear to have been non-existent or to have 
failed in these Mexican listed corporations. 
 The most spectacular failures were the TV AZTECA scandals in 2005, COMERCIAL 
MEXICANA in 2008 and the Wal-Mart case in 2012. A number of other cases in Mexico are 
revealed on the SEC webpage. As Jordan and Ahmad (2011) point out, the COMERCIAL 
MEXICANA case shows the perils of trying to make money on financial instruments rather 
than focussing on core businesses. This is a case that shows exposure to risk, lack of control, 
and the ineffectiveness of the audit committee and independent board members. As the 
chairman of the Mexican Banking and Securities Commission points out: “we have detected 
at least eight where we could infer there were problems with disclosure” (Randewich & 
Rojas Mena, 2008). Some of the best-connected independent board members also sat on 
boards of affected or failing companies.7 We do not wish to claim that these scandals are 
entirely the result of interlocking boards of directors, but suffice to say they have played their 
part in failing to protect minority, and in some cases majority, shareholders.  
These cases also show that in Mexican corporations independent board members are 
performing simply a symbolic role. As Bourdieu (1991:126) observes, “the legitimate 
representative is an object of guaranteed belief, certified as correct. He lives up in reality to 
his appearance, he really is what everyone believes him to be because his reality – whether 
priest, teacher or minister – is based not on his personal conviction or pretension … but rather 
on the collective belief, guaranteed by the institution and made concrete through 
qualifications like stripes, uniforms and other attributes.” Like Bourdieu’s minister or priest, 
Mexican independent directors seem to playing the same game. Similar to previous studies 
(Useem, 1984; Granovetter, 1985; Davis, 1996; Mizruchi, 1996) in Mexico, we claim that, by 
participating in board meetings and sitting on different boards, independent board members 
are performing ritual practices that do not contribute to the effective monitoring of the 
company’s affairs.  
6. Concluding remarks 
 We begin this section by considering the empirical questions set out earlier: namely, 
whether there is a pattern of interlocking boards, and the positions which actors occupy in the 
network structure of interlocking boards in Mexico. By applying SNA, this paper examines 
the connections between Mexican corporations and actors. Using the measures of SNA 
developed by Freeman (1979), we identify the most powerful and influential actors in the 
network structure of board members in Mexico. Table 2 describes the eigenvalues of SNA 
calculated using UCINET, in which board members are arranged from high to low levels of 
“connections”. Board members with the greatest number of connections occupy a central 
position in the network and are able to transmit information and to influence other boards. 
We also find that, in Mexico, independent board members have created a network structure 
of social relationships through interlocking boards. For example, Figures 1 and 2 present the 
network structure of companies sharing two or more board members. For example, in Table 1 
we present the (interpersonal) network of boardroom contacts among the top 15 board 
members in the Mexican Stock Market.  
 Turning to theoretical questions, why does this network exist and what are the 
potential implications for corporate governance practices? Drawing on Bourdieu’s notion of 
social capital (1986), we have demonstrated that how and why Mexican corporations have 
created a durable network of institutionalized relationships. It is clear that the interlocked 
directorate is a social space where members pursue material and symbolic exchanges. In 
other words, the creation of a network of interlocking boards in Mexican listed corporations 
aims to institutionalize a particular corporate governance practice of independent board 
members who do not monitor the company’s affairs. They perform a social ritual tending to 
consecrate or legitimate an arbitrary boundary to produce and reproduce lasting, useful 
relationships that can secure material or symbolic profits (Bourdieu, 1986, 1991). This 
questions the role of independent directors in monitoring and protecting minority 
shareholders in Mexico and elsewhere in the world.  
 This study contributes to the study of powerful and influential actors in the network 
structure of interlocking directorates in emerging economies and Mexico. The SNA of 
interlocking directorates described in this paper has great potential to contribute to corporate 
governance research. Firstly, the results suggest that the interlocking directorates and 
positions of powerful and influential actors may render corporate governance reforms 
ineffective.  It would be reasonable to assume that strong capital markets and the presence of 
institutional investors protect minority interests, even in strongly interlocking directorates. 
Without strong capital markets and institutional investors, a network of directors may prevent 
independent directors from acting independently. Further research should be conducted to 
explore these issues. 
 Secondly, Bourdieu’s notion of social capital is a very useful narrative to understand 
the network of relationship. Network of independent directors and the durability of the 
network are clearly understood from motivations of powerful actors derived from material, 
cultural and symbolic exchanges. Examining the network of directors from a ‘social capital’ 
point of view also enable us to understand why the role of independent directors is 
ineffective. The view of social capital as resources embedded in networks is helpful for 
understanding why minority shareholders’ interests are infringed more in some areas than in 
others (Uddin and Chowdhury, 2008). This paper denaturalizes mainstream research on 
independent directors and advance a counter argument that advocates positive links of 
independent directors and book value of the corporation. Bourdieu´s idea of social capital 
clearly demonstrates that the relational practice of boards is in the interest of board members 
and their investment strategies only to preserve their benefits. And that is with the consent of 
majority shareholders, because majority shareholders will invite those board members with 
substantial social, cultural and symbolic capital, but loyal to them. So, there is a type of 
complicity. They are like a kind of "club of acquaintances". And the person who exercises 
power is the majority shareholder, because he/she possesses the most valuable capital 
(economic capital).  
 Thirdly, the paper has also opened space for further research especially the use of 
SNA and understanding power and interests of networks and actors in the network. First, it 
would be useful to examine cross-cultural differences in networks of directors. It has also 
been suggested (La Porta, Lopez de Silanes & Schleifer, 1999, La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, & 
Vishny, 2000) that corporate governance regulation and implementation vary across countries 
with different legal systems. One aspect of these differences may be the way in which 
domestic regulatory regimes have historically been shaped by colonial regimes. French 
colonies have different regimes from Spanish colonial countries. Countries’ links with 
transnational bodies should also be considered. For example, Mexican corporate governance 
reforms have been influenced by OECD. More generally, the approach used here could be 
replicated in other countries.  
 Fourthly, interlocking boards and networks are not static, and a longitudinal analysis 
would provide evidence of the network dynamics that affect board activities and the role of 
independent directors in company affairs. As Gilbert et al. (2011:83) have observed, social 
networks exhibit temporal dynamics in a number of ways. Instances in the data may appear 
and disappear over time, whereby different time windows may exhibit different 
characteristics. For example, a person may change his affiliation with a business organization 
by joining a different business enterprise and developing new social ties within this new 
environment. This approach could also be combined with a close focus on key players to 
track their paths within the network. As we have revealed, several high-profile individuals 
have important positions in some large corporations. It would be interesting to establish how 
they reached the key positions in the network. This would, perhaps, unravel the workings of 
wider corporate governance issues, such as reforms. This study provides a foundation for a 
deeper understanding of the cosy relationship of directors, family networks and their 
influence on corporate governance practices in Mexico and elsewhere. 
 Finally, the network mapped in this paper is based on directors’ links. While these are 
important, other types of network linkages are also important, and the relative effects of 
different kinds of links on outcomes should be explored, for example the political networks 
of large corporations, regulatory networks, family networks, and various other informal 
networks. All these influence the protection of shareholders’ interests and the overall 
transparency and accountability of company affairs. As previous studies have indicated, we 
need to gain a better understanding of the role played in corporate governance failures by 
family networks with political affiliations, especially in emerging economies (Uddin and 
Choudhury, 2008). These areas, though important, remain under-investigated and under-
theorized. 
                                                 
1
 A graph is made up of nodes connected by lines. In this study, corporations and board members are nodes, and 
connections between them are edges. Another important concept of graph theory is degree, which is the number 
of edges connected to a node. 
2
 UCINET is a social network analysis program developed by Steve Borgatti, Martin Everett and Lin Freeman. 
As Knove and Yang (2008:2) observe, “UCINET with its continually updated versions is probably the most 
popular and extensively used software package, providing comprehensive solutions and implementation of 
many network methods”. 
3
 Fernando Ruiz Sahagun is a member of the board of directors of the following companies: Kimberly Clark, 
Modelo Group, Mexichem, San Luis Corporation, Grupo Mexico, Empresas ICA, Grupo Financiero 
SANTANDER, Grupo POCHTECA, Fresnillo, the Mexican Stock Market, Arcelor Mittal Lazaro Cardenas, and 
INDEVAL. He is chairman of the Fiscal Committee of the Mexican Coordinated Council, and he represents the 
Mexican Council of Businessmen in the Secretary of Fiscal and Public Credit of Mexico. 
4
 Alberto Bailleres Gonzalez is a member of the board of directors of the following companies: Grupo KUO, 
Industrias Penoles, Grupo Nacional Provincial, GNP Pensiones, Profuturo, Valores Mexicanos, Casa de Bolsa, 
Grupo Palacio de Hierro, FEMSA, Grupo Televisa and Grupo BBVA. 
5
 Fernando Senderos Mestre is board member of Industrias Peñoles, Grupo Carso, S.A., Kimberly Clark, Grupo 
Televisa, Grupo Desc, GNP, Grupo Carso and of the Mexican Council of Businessmen. 
6
 Valentin Diez Morodo is an independent board member in Kimberly-Clark de Mexico, Grupo Financier 
Banamex, Grupo Kuo, Alfa, Grupo Dine, Grupo Mexico, Bodegas Vega Sicilia, Acciones y Valores de Mexico, 
Zara Mexico, Grupo Aeromexico, Citigroup, Inc, OHL Mexico, Telefonica Mexico and Instituto de Empresa, 
Madrid. 
7
 This is also the case for the ALFA group, in which we detected Mr Claudio X Gonzalez Laporte, who sits on 
eight boards and is ranked 4th in degree centrality (see Table 1), Mr Valentin Diez Morado, who sits on seven 
boards and is ranked 5th in degree centrality, and Mr Enrique Castillo Sanchez Mejorada, who sits on seven 
boards and is ranked 10th in degree centrality. All of these were board members of ALFA group during the 
Mexican derivatives crisis in 2008. 
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